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COMMENTS
FEDERAL TAX LIENS
REX M. WALKER
The field of federal taxation is an area of law the complexities of
which are unparalleled. In addition, the law of taxation is very fluid
and the rule of today is more frequently than not gone tomorrow. The
general practitioner sensed this problem at an early date and defaulted
the tax practice to others who chose to specialize in tax law. However,
one need only pick up a recent reporter and examine its contents to
become aware of the fact that there is one facet of the federal tax law
that is the concern of every active practitioner. This is the federal
tax lien. This lien has no respect for the standard concepts of creditor
security law, and has succeeded in fashioning a new set of rules which
govern its priority. These rules are so contrary to the concepts that
govern common law liens that the unwary and uninformed are almost
certain to run afoul of them.
The purpose of this comment is to set out the basic statutory law
on which the federal tax lien is founded, to examine the scope of the
federal tax lien and its relative priority, and to indicate some of the
precautions that can be taken to protect a credit transaction from it.
CREATION OF THE LIEN
The statutory provision which creates a lien in favor of the govern-
ment is found in Section 6321 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code.
Section 6321 provides:
If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same
after demand, the amount (including any interest, additional amount,
additional to tax, or assessable penalty, together with any costs that
may accrue in addition thereto) shall be a lien in favor of the United
States upon all property and rights to property, whether real or
personal, belonging to such person.
The federal government has seen fit to insure that the creation of
the lien is a simple task. All that need be done to create the tax lien
is for the Collector to make an assessment and a demand on the delin-
quent taxpayer.' Contrary to traditional practices for the creation of
liens the government is not required to take possession of the property
INT. REv. CODE of 1954 § 6322. Detroit Bank v. U.S., 317 U.S. 329 (1943) ; Guar-
anty Trust Co. v. McKendrick, 5 F2d 553 (4th Cir. 1925) ; Cattani v. Korsan, 29 N.J.
Super. 581, 103 A.2d 51 (1954).
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to which the lien has attached, nor is filing a public notice a condition
precedent to the creation of it.
The assessment and demand are both bathed in a cloak of secrecy;
an interested party has no practical way of determining whether or
not the lien exists if notice thereof has not been filed. Yet with these
simple procedural steps the federal government has a lien the priorities
of which are unknown among the ranks of private liens.
PROPERTY TO WHICH THE LIEN ATTACHES
The federal tax lien is like a giant invisible octopus which has thou-
sands of tentacles which reach out and attach to the property of the
delinquent taxpayer. Section 6321 states that the lien attaches .. . upon
all the property and rights to property, whether real or personal, be-
longing to such person," i.e., the delinquent taxpayer. Though this may
appear to be a simple statement, there is no property, tangible or
intangible, which escapes the grasp of this lien.' Thus, as has been
stated, once the lien attaches "the property has in a sense two owners,
the taxpayer, and, to the extent of the lien, the United States."3
It goes without saying that the tax lien can reach no greater interest
in the property than that which the taxpayer owns. The extent of this
interest is governed by state law.4 The federal tax lien also attaches
to after-acquired property.'
The rule is well-established that exemptions are governed by federal
law, and state exemption laws are not operative. Property which by
state law is exempt from the claims of creditors is subject to the federal
tax lien and also subject to distraint.8 Section 6334 exempts certain
property from distraint. But it should be noted that this property is not
2 The tax lien has been held to attach to the following types of property: Investment
and Security Co. v. Robbins, 49 F. Supp. 620 (E.D. Wash. 1943) (intangible prop-
erty) ; U.S. v. Cox, 119 F. Supp. 147 (N.D. Ga. 1953) (equity of redemption) ; Nelson
v. U.S., 139 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1943) (crops); Welsh v. U.S., 220 F.2d 200 (D.C.
Cir. 1955) (money); U.S. v. Behrens, 130 F. Supp. 93 (E.D. N.Y. 1955) (cash sur-
render value of life insurance policies) ; MacKenzie v. U.S., 109 F2d 540 (9th Cir.
1940 (alimony payments); U.S. v. National City Bank of N.Y., 32 F. Supp. 890 (S.D.
N.Y. 1940) (bank deposits); U.S. v. Brandenburg, 106 F. Supp. 82 (S.D. Cal. 1952)
(jointly owned property); I.T. 3356, 1940-1 CB p. 72 (partner's interest in partner-ship) ; U.S.v. Dallas Nat. Bank, 152 F2d 582 (5th Cir. 1946) (taxpayer's interest in a
trust); Goldenberg v. Westover, 150 Fd 388 (9th Cir. 1945) (bankruptcy funds);Citizens State Bank v. Vidal, 114 F2d 380 (10th Cir. 1940) (balance owning on a
construction contract) ; U.S. v. Warren R. Co., 127 F2d 134 (2nd Cir. 1942) (lease-hold interest) ; In re Decker's Estate, 355 Pa. 331, 49 A.2d 714 (1946) (pledged prop-
erty).SU.S. v. Greenville, 118 F2d 963 (4th Cir. 1941).
'Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930).Citizens National Trust and Savings Bank v. U.S., 135 Fd 527 (9th Cir. 1943);
Glass City Bank v. U.S., 326 U.S. 265 (1945).7 U.S.v. Heifron, 158 F2d 657 (9th Cir. 1947); Sambough v. Schofield, 132 F.2d
345 (5th Cir. 1943).
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exempt from the lien, but merely cannot be distrained for the collection
of the delinquent taxes.7 Whether such property will enjoy a like im-
munity in the hands of a transferee remains an open question.
COMMUNITY PROPERTY CONSIDERATIONS
Resolving the federal tax lien and the Washington community prop-
erty system is not an easy task. The tax liability for the community
income is split between the husband and the wife, each of them being
personally liable for the tax on one half of the community income.' In
such a case the lien would attach to the community property and also
to the separate property of the individual members to the extent of
their respective liabilities.9
However, if the delinquent taxes are for the separate income of one
of the spouses, the results cannot be so summarily stated. It is beyond
doubt that such an obligation is a separate debt. There is no question
that the lien would attach to the separate property of the delinquent
taxpayer and that such a lien is enforceable. It would also attach to
the spouse's share of the community property. But whether the federal
government can enforce its lien on the spouse's one-half interest in
community property presents a doubtful question because Washington
law declares that a spouse's interest in community property is exempt
from execution for separate debts."0 Query: Will the state law be rec-
ognized or does federal law govern?
It is possible that the state immunity can be invoked in such a situa-
tion on the theory that it presents a question of ownership and state
law controls. In the case of Morgan v. Moynahan" the wife was allowed
to restrain the sale of community property under a distraint for the
husband's delinquent taxes. The court stated at page 525: "Any dis-
position of the husband's interest (community property) which inter-
feres with her (the wife's) possession and use, reduces or affects its
value, or clouds her title may be enjoined."
However, it is also possible that the immunity of community prop-
erty from separate debts will be classed as a state exemption, and will
not be operative against the federal government. The law on this
7 U.S. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 46 F. Supp. 30, (D. Conn. 1942).
8 Saenger v. Commissioner, 69 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1934); Hopkins v. Bacon, 282
U.S. 122 (1930).
9 Smith v. Donnelly, 65 F. Supp. 415 (E.D. La. 1946).
10 Stockand v. Bartlett, 4 Wash. 730, 31 Pac. 24 (1892).
1186 F. Supp. 522 (S.D. Tex. 1949). See also Paddock v. Silmoniet, 147 Tex. 571,
218 S.W.2d 428 (1949) ; Jones v. Kemp, 114 F.2d 478 (10th Cir. 1944).
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problem is in the formative stages; however, it does present a possible
defense against the tax lien foreclosure in a community property state.
PRIORITY OF THE FEDERAL LIEN
The priority problems presented by the federal tax lien are simple
when the only interested parties are the taxpayer and the federal gov-
ernment. On these facts the government is free to liquidate all the
property, both tangible and intangible, that the taxpayer owns, with
the exception of that exempted by Section 6334. But if third parties
also seek satisfaction of claims out of the same property the problems
are complex. In such a situation it is necessary to determine the pri-
ority of the competing claimants.
The Revenue Code does not grant the federal tax lien priority over
various third party competing liens, and the task of determining its
priority has fallen upon the courts."
The federal lien is deemed to be specific and perfected, 1 and its
relative priority is a federal question. 4 The upshot of this is that the
federal courts can grant priority to the federal lien over a private lien,
even though by state law standards the private lien would be given
priority over a competing private lien were it in the position of the
federal tax lien.
In determining the priority of the federal lien it must be recognized
that the code has divided private liens into two general classes:
(1) Those against which the tax lien is effective from the date on which
the assessment is received and a demand is made by the District Col-
lector. For this class of liens it is not necessary that a notice of the
tax lien be filed of record before it is prior in right- (2) Those against
which the federal lien is not effective unless notice of the tax lien has
been filed prior to the perfection of the private lien."
The mechanics of filing a notice of a tax lien are simple. The notice
of the lien sets out the name of the delinquent taxpayer and the amount
of the government's claim. It is filed in the office of the local state offi-
cial that has been designated for this purpose. If one has not been
designated then the requirement is met by filing a copy of the notice
with the clerk of the district court. 6 In Washington the county audi-
12 It must also be assumed that the taxpayer is solvent. If the contrary is found,
different rules of priority will follow. See 31 U.S. C.A. 191.
"U .S. v. Greenville, 118 F.2d 963 (4th Gir. 1941).
1"U.S. v. Acri, 348 U.S. 211 (1954).15 INT. REv. CODE of 1954 § 6323 provides in part ... the lien imposed by section
6321 shall not be valid as against any mortgagee, pledgee, purchaser, or judgment
creditor until notice thereof has been filed by the Secretary or his delegate..."
18 INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323.
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tor's office of the county wherein the property subject to the lien is
situated has been designated as the proper office in which to file a notice
of the tax lien.'
Before a lien which falls within the first class mentioned above can
achieve priority over the federal tax lien, it must appear that it has
attached, and also was specific and perfected before the assessment list
was received by the District Collector.18 These two requirements are
cumulative. The requirement that the lien must be specific and per-
fected is of recent vintage and was added by the United States Supreme
Court in the case of United States v. Security Trust and Savings Bank. 9
The impact of the Security Trust case is great enough to warrant
special attention. In that case, a private creditor attached the taxpayer's
property at the outset of the action. Subsequent thereto, but prior to
the attaching creditor taking judgment, a tax lien attached to the
property. It was held that the tax lien was prior in right, since the
attachment was not "specific and perfected" but was a mere "caveat
of a more perfect lien to come." The court also stated,
Nor can the doctrine of relation back-which by process of judicial
reasoning merges the attachment lien in the judgment and relates the
judgment lien back to the date of the attachment-operate to destroy
the realities of the situation.
Thus two new concepts were spawned by the Security Trust case:
1-A private lien must be specific and perfected before it can possi-
bly be prior in right to a federal tax lien.
2-The court will not indulge in the fictional relation back doctrine in
order to relate the specific and perfected status of the lien back
to the date when it first attached in its inchoate status.
Armed with these two principles the Internal Revenue Collector
has yet to lose a major battle with a private lien.2"
Attaining the status of "specific and perfected" is not an easy goal
for the private lien. A lien is deemed to be specific and perfected when
17RCW 60.68.010-.040.
1 Fleming v. Brownfield, 47 Wn2d 857, 290 P2d 993 (1955) ; Weitz v. Electrova-
tion, Inc, 48 Wn.2d 604, 295 P2d 728 (1956).
29 340 U.S. 47 (1950).
20 The following cases illustrate the success that the Collector has enjoyed: U.S. v.
White Bear Brewing Co., 350 U.S. 1010 (1956) (federal tax lien held superior to
mechanic's lien) ; United States v. Colotta, 350 U.S. 808 (1955) (federal tax lien held
superior to mechanic's lien); U.S. v. Liverpool and London Inc. Co., 348 U.S. 215
(1955) (federal tax lien held superior to garnishment lien) ; U.S. v. Scovil, 348 U.S. 218
(1955) (federal lien held superior to landlord's lien) ; U.S. v. New Britain, 347 U.S.
81 (1954) (federal tax lien held superior to lien for local taxes); U.S. v. Gilbert
Associates Inc., 345 U.S. 361 (1953) (federal tax lien held superior to lien for local
taxes).
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the identity of the lienor is certain, the property subject to the lien is
identified, and the amount of the lien is certain.'
While it is true that the government can keep its lien a secret and
prevail against subsequent liens and all prior liens which are not specific
and perfected, it must be remembered that Section 6323 creates an
exception to this rule. This section provides that the tax lien is not
valid against a mortgagee, pledgee, purchaser, or judgment creditor
acquiring a lien or an interest in the property, unless notice of the
tax lien was filed of record prior to the perfection of the private interest.
As one might imagine, there has been a great deal of scurrying about
by creditors attempting to qualify as one of the chosen few and thus
enjoy the privileges afforded by this section.
Mortgagee
Generally a mortgage which is recorded before notice of the tax lien
is filed creates a lien prior in right." In order to enjoy priority the
mortgage must be bona fide," but the fact that the mortgagee knows
that an assessment has been made does not deny him the protection
afforded by Section 6323.1
If a mortgage is executed before a tax lien is filed, but recorded after
the tax lien has been filed, the tax lien is prior in right.' However, the
mortgagee need not give a present consideration for the mortgage as
an antecedent debt is deemed a sufficient consideration.uB
A literal reading of Section 6323 would seem to require that any
mortgage filed of record prior to the time the District Collector files
a notice of the tax lien is entitled to priority. This perhaps is the gen-
eral rule, but here again the practitioner is going to feel the pinch of
the test adopted in the Security Trust case, which requires that a
private lien be specific and perfected and which also rejects the relation
back doctrine.
It seems almost certain that a mortgage which is of record before
the tax lien notice but which is forced to rely on the relation back
doctrine will not be granted priority. For example, the status of an
21 U.S. v. White Bear Brewing Co. Inc., 350 U.S. 1010 (1956) ; Fleming v. Brown-
field, 47 Wn2d 857, 290 P2d 993 (1955) ; Illinois v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362 (1946);
In re Carroll Const. Co., 41 Wn.2d 317, 249 P.2d 234 (1952).
22 Ormsbee v. U.S., 23 F.2d 926 (S.D. Fla. 1928); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
U.S., 107 F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1939) ; Bank of America v. U.S., 84 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.
Cal. 1949).23 Hart v. U.S., 207 F.2d 813 (8th Cir. 1953).24 U.S. v. Beaver Run Coal Co., 99 F2d 610 (3rd Cir. 1938).25 Exchange National Bank of Tulsa v. Davy, 13 F. Supp. 226 (N.D. Okla. 1936).
20 Ferris v. Chic-Mint Gum Co., 14 Del. Ch. 232, 124 A. 577 (1924).
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open-end mortgage which is recorded prior to the time a notice of a
tax lien is filed, but upon which advances are made after notice of the
tax lien is filed, remains in doubt. The Internal Revenue Service has
issued a ruling that a mortgagee is afforded no protection by Section
6323 for advances made after the notice of the tax lien is filed."' The
ruling rests squarely on the holding in the Security Trust case.
The utility of the open-end mortgage as a credit device is universally
recognized, and the courts have judicially sanctioned its use.28 How-
ever, the priority of the advances under such a mortgage often turns
on whether or not the advances are obligatory or optional. The advances
which are obligatory are generally given priority over intervening in-
terests," while the optional advances are not given priority.3
The Revenue Ruling makes no distinction between advances which
are optional and those which are obligatory. The upshot of the ruling
is that a mortgagee can not safely make an advance without first search-
ing for a tax lien notice.
Common everyday mortgage transactions which rely on the relation
back doctrine present similar problems. What is the status of the
mortgage covering after-acquired property, where the tax lien is filed
prior to the acquisition of the property, but after the mortgage is re-
corded? What of the situation where a purchase money mortgage is
taken after a tax lien has been filed against the mortgagor? A like
problem is presented by the situation where a mortgage is recorded,
but prior to the time the loan is actually made, notice of the tax lien is
filed. This latter problem is illustrated by the normal construction loan,
where periodic advances are made as the need arises, yet the mortgage
does not contain a future advance clause.
It is possible that all of the above examples run afoul of the rule
of the Security Trust case. The Revenue Ruling on the open-end mort-
gage problem certainly tips the hand of the Collector, and there is no
doubt that he will assert that such mortgages are not entitled to priority.
While it is impossible to determine with any degree of certainty just
what the outcome of these cases will be, it would behoove mortgagees
to enter such transactions with caution.
27 Revenue Ruling 56-41; 1956 Int. Rev. Bull. No. 6 at 15.
28 Savings and Loan Assn. v. Burton, 20 Wash, 688, 56 Pac. 940 (1899);
Heal v. Evans Creek Coal and Coke Co., 71 Wash. 225, 128 Pac. 211 (1912). See
Annot., 81 A.L.R. 631; Comment, 18 Wash. L. Rev. 24 (1943).
29 Cedar v. W. E. Roche Fruit Co., 16 Wn.2d 652, 134 P.2d 437 (1943).30 Elmendorf-Anthony Co. v. Dunn, 10 Wn.2d 29, 116 P.2d 253 (1941).
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Pledgee
A pledgee has a lien prior in right, unless notice of the tax lien is of
record prior to the creation of the pledge.31 However, if the pledge is
created after the tax lien has been filed the tax lien is prior in right.32
The courts will give the transaction close scrutiny to determine if in
fact a bona fide pledge was contemplated by the parties, or whether
a pledge for purposes other than security was intended." If the
transaction is an assignment (i.e. the assignee holds in a capacity other
than as a pledgee) the assignee takes subject to the secret tax lien,
whereas if the transaction is a pledge the pledgee holds the property
free of the secret tax lien.
Purchaser
Section 6323 also grants protection to a purchaser unless the tax lien
is of record prior to the date of the purchase. The United States Su-
preme Court has recently stated:
A purchaser within the meaning of 3672 (Section 6323 in the 1954
code) usually means one who acquires title for a valuable consideration
in the manner of vendor and vendee.34
The court's statement that title is necessary to qualify as a purchaser
casts a cloud of doubt over the status of the vendee who purchases
under a conditional sales contract. Such a vendee acquires no title
until the contract is paid off. Whether or not the Supreme Court will
treat the conditional vendee as a purchaser remains an open question.
The lower courts have held that a conditional vendee is a purchaser.36
Contrary to the treatment given a mortgagee, it has been held that
a purchase made with notice or knowledge of the fact that a tax lien
exists is not protected by Section 6323, notwithstanding the fact that
notice of the lien is not filed.
31 INT. REv. CoDE of 1954 § 6323.
3 Grand Prairie State Bank v. U.S., 206 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1953) ; U.S. v. Cald-
well, 74 F. Supp. 114 (M.D. Tenn. 1947).33 Knight v. Knight, 71 N.Y.S.2d 357 (1947) ; U.S. v. Gargil, 218 F.2d 556 (1st Cir.
1955) ; U.S. v. E. Regensburg and Sons, 124 F. Supp. 687 (S.D. N.Y. 1954).
04 United States v. Scovil, 348 U.S. 244 (1955) ; In re Litt, 128 F. Supp. 34 (E.D.
Penn. 1955).
85 See U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 301.632-1, which defines a purchaser as "a person
who, for a valuable present consideration acquires property or an interest in property."36 Tildesley Coal Co., v. American Fuel Corp. 130 W.Va. 720, 45 S.E. 2d 750 (1947).
See also National Refining Co. v. U.S., 160 F.2d 951 (8th Cir. 1947). It is possible
for an assignee to qualify as a purchaser. See National Refining Co. v. U.S., supra;
Exchange National Bank v. Davy, 13 F. Supp. 226 (N.D. Okla. 1936).
87 U.S. v. Rosebush, 45 F. Supp. 664 (E.D. Wis. 1942) ; Hayword v. U.S., 2 F.2d
467 (5th Cir. 1924).
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Judgment Creditor
A "judgment creditor" is also given protection by Section 6323, and
the tax lien is not effective against a judgment creditor unless notice
of the lien is filed prior to the acquisition of the judgment. Determining
who qualifies as a judgment creditor within the meaning of this section
is not as simple as it might seem. The United States Supreme Court
has stated that a judgment creditor is one who has a judgment from a
court of record.38 The Commissioner of Internal Revenue has taken
the position that the mere obtaining of a judgment does not afford any
protection under this section.8" The Commissioner requires that a per-
fected lien on the property be obtained under such judgment before
priority can be attained."0 In Washington a judgment creates a lien
on the "real estate" of the judgment debtor located within this state."
No such lien is created on the personal property of the judgment debtor.
Thus as far as personal property is concerned, it apparently is neces-
sary for the judgment creditor to levy on property before he has at-
tained the status of judgment creditor within the meaning of Section
6323.
Securities
The priority of a tax lien on a "security" is governed by special
rules. The code in Section 6323(c) (2) defines a security as:
. . . the term "security" means any bond, debenture, note, or certifi-
cate or other evidence of indebtedness, issued by any corporation
(including one issued by a government or political subdivision there-
of), with interest coupons or in registered form, share of stock, voting
trust certificate, or any certificate of interest or participation in certi-
ficate of deposit or receipt for, temporary or interim certificate for,
or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing;
negotiable instrument; or money.
Notwithstanding the fact that notice of the tax lien has been filed, the
lien is not valid against a mortgagee, pledgee, or purchaser of a
security unless they have acquired their interest in the security with
actual knowledge that a tax lien existed thereon. The special treatment
given securities is necessary to maintain their negotiable character.
88 U.S. v. Gilbert Associates, 345 U.S. 361 (1953).
89 U.S.Treas. Reg. 118, § 301-632-1.
40 See Miller v. Bank of America, 166 F.2d 415 (9th Cir. 1948), which held that a
specific lien under the judgment was necessary.
41 RCW 4.56.190 and RCW 4.56.200.
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Mechanics' and Materialmen' s Lien
In every major battle the mechanics' and materialmen's lien have
had with a federal tax lien, the former has come out second best. The
recent case of Fleming v. Brownfield"2 illustrates the fate of the me-
chanics' and materialmen's lien when doing battle with the federal tax
lien. In that case a claim for mechanics' and materialmen's lien was
filed and an action commenced to reduce the lien to judgment. Subse-
quent thereto, but prior to the entry of the judgment, the federal gov-
ernment filed a notice of its tax lien and intervened in the action. It
was held that the federal lien was prior in right because the mechanics'
lien was not "specific and perfected" by federal law standards. It
should be noted that the plaintiff had done everything possible under
the local law to perfect the lien, yet priority was denied.
The inequities of the situation are immediately apparent. The me-
chanic and the materialman are void of any method of protecting
themselves. The federal tax lien can remain secret while the mechanic
and materialman enhance the value of the taxpayer's property. Even
though the federal lien is a secret, it takes priority over the mechanics'
and materialmen's lien and receives the benefit of this enhanced value.
This is unjust enrichment in its grossest forml
The judicial decisions in this area are so strongly entrenched that it
will take legislation to correct the situation. An amendment to Section
6323 has been introduced in the United States Congress. 3 This amend-
ment would include "mechanic lienors" in the class of liens against
which the tax lien is ineffective until notice thereof has been filed. The
bill also includes a definition of "mechanic lienor" which is aimed at
defeating the requirement that the lien be specific and perfected.
Such legislation is not only desirous but is necessary for the pro-
motion of building activities. It is also necessary if the mechanics' and
materialmen's liens are to be restored to the secured position that
they once enjoyed.
FLING AND RECORDING
Deciding in which county public records should be searched to deter-
mine if a notice of a federal tax lien has been filed presents a thorny
task. Section 6223 provides that notice must be filed in the "... office
42 47 Wn2d 857, 290 P.2d 993 (1955). See U.S. v. White Bear Brewing Co., 350
U.S. 1010 (1956); U.S. v. Colotta, 350 U.S. 808 (1955); U.S. v. King County Iron
Works, 224 F.2d 232 (2nd Cir. 1955) ; U.S. v. Eisinger Mill and Lumber Co., 202 Md.
Rep. 613, 98 A.2d 81 (1953).
'3H.R. Rep. No. 77967, 84th Cong. (1956).
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designated by the law of the State or Territory in which the property
subject to the lien is situated." In Washington the county auditor's
office of the county in which the property subject to the lien is located
has been designated as the proper place to file notice of the federal
tax lien.4
When dealing with real property the problem is simple. The notice
can be properly filed in only one place, i.e., the county wherein the
property is situated. When dealing with personal property the situa-
tion becomes acute. 5 Relying on the doctrine that the situs of per-
sonal property is the domicile of the owner, it has been held that a
notice filed in the county wherein the delinquent taxpayer is domiciled
is sufficient filing, notwithstanding the fact that the property is actually
situated in a different county."6 This rule has been applied to both
tangible personal property and to intangibles."
Both the federal and the state acts are silent about refiling in case
the property is moved to a different county after filing has once been
perfected. Presumably the filing once perfected remains valid even
though the property is moved to another county48 or indeed even to
another state. 9
The rule that filing in the taxpayer's domicile is sufficient filing of
the notice for personal property, regardless of its actual situs, is the
result of judicial legislation. What would be the result if notice is filed
in a county where the property is in fact situated? Such filing would
certainly fall within the literal wording of the recording acts. To date
there is no case dealing with the validity of such filing.
This present state of the law makes it virtually impossible to deter-
mine whether or not a federal tax lien on personal property has been
filed. To determine whether a tax lien is a matter of record it is sug-
44 RCW 60.68.010-040.
45 When dealing with a "security" the mortgagee, pledgee or purchaser is not
required to search the records. See § 6323.
46 Grand Prairie State Bank v. U.S., 206 F2d 217 (5th Cir. 1953); U.S. v.
Spreckels, 50 F. Supp. 789 (N.D. Calif. 1943) ; U.S. v. Royce Shoe Co., 137 F. Supp.
786 (D. N.H. 1956) ; U.S. v. King County Iron Works, 224 F.2d 232 (2nd Cir. 1955) ;
Investment and Securities Co. v. U.S., 140 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1944). But see Gulf
Coast Marine Ways Inc. v. The J. R. Hardee, 107 F. Supp. 379 (S.D. Texas 1952).
47 Grand Prairie State Bank v. U.S., supra note 46, (tangible property) ; U.S. v.
Royce Shoe Co., supra note 46 (intangible property).
48 In the case of Grand Prairie State Bank v. U.S., supra note 46, the court found
that filing had in fact been perfected and then stated that it was not necessary to
thereafter file in every county to which the property might subsequently be moved.
49 Investment and Securities Co. v. U.S., supra note 46. Here notice filed in the
state of Wisconsin was held sufficient to give notice in the state of Washington. The
authority of this case is somewhat diluted, however, because the intervening lienor in
Washington had actual notice of the tax lien.
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gested that a search be made of the public records in the county
wherein the taxpayer is domiciled and also in every county into which
the property has at one time or another been taken.
The cost of such an undertaking is of course prohibitive for some
chattels, such as automobiles. Perhaps the only solution is a complete
examination of the tax status of a person furnishing a security interest
in personal property.
DURATION OF THE LIEN
Having once attached, how long does the federal tax lien remain
enforceable? Section 6322 states that the lien shall continue until it is
"satisfied or becomes unenforceable by operation of time." That the
lien is extinguished when the underlying debt is satisfied states the
obvious. The lien becomes unenforceable by operation of law when
the underlying debt which the lien secures becomes unenforceable by
reason of lapse of time. Under Section 6502 a tax becomes unenforc-
able six years after the date of the assessment, unless the taxpayer
agrees to an extension of time prior to the expiration of the six year
period."° Thus in the usual case the lien will have a life of six years,
with the period commencing from the date the assessment was made.
However, the federal government need not sit idly by and let time
fill out the death certificate on its lien. The life of the lien can be
indefinitely prolonged by commencing an action within the six years
to reduce the tax debt to a judgment. Once the tax debt is merged in
the judgment there is no limitation of time during which the judgment
must be collected. The judgment does not discharge the lien, " but
rather the lien continues and is enforceable as long as the judgment is
valid, which theoretically is forever.
FoRECLOSURE
As discussed earlier, a mortgage which is recorded prior to the filing
of notice of the federal tax lien is generally prior in right. 2 However,
50 An extention of the statute of limitation by the taxpayer is operative against
the creditors of the taxpayer. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y. v. Moore, 29 F. Supp.
179 (E.D. Ill. 1939) ; United States v. Ettelson 159 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1947).
51 United States v. Caldwell, 74 F. Supp. 114, (M.D. Tenn. 1947) (Assessment
made in 1932, judgment taken in 1938. Held, the lien was still valid in 1946) ; Invest-
ment and Securities Co. v. U.S., 140 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1944) (Assessment made in
1934, judgment taken in 1937. Held, the lien still in existence in 1941) ; United States
v. Ettelson, 159 F.2d 193, (7th Cir. 1947) (Assessment made in 1937, in 1938 legal
proceedings were commenced. Held, the lien was still in existence in 1944).
52 INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323. See also U.S. v. Sampsell, 153 F.2d 731 (9th Cir.
1946); Schmitz v. Stockman, 151 Kan. 891,101 P.2d 962 (1940); U.S. v. Beaver Run
Coal Co., 99 F.2d 610 (3rd Cir. 1938) ; Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y. v. Moore, 29
F. Supp. 179 (N.D. Ill. 1939).
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this temporary victory should not lull the mortgagee into a false sense
of security. Should it become necessary to foreclose the mortgage the
federal tax lien is still a problem to be reckoned with.
The mortgagee who follows normal foreclosure procedure, without
considering the posibility of an existing federal lien, will find that the
purchaser at the foreclosure sale takes subject to the federal lien, if
notice thereof has been filed. 3 If the federal lien is not a matter of
record on the sale date then the purchaser is protected by Section 6323
and takes the property free of the federal lien.
The procedure that can be employed to free property of a junior
federal tax lien in a foreclosure sale is simple and free from pitfalls.
The mortgagee has two courses of action which can be pursued. The
mortgagee can seek a certificate of release, 4 and if this fails, the fed-
eral government can be joined in the foreclosure action as a junior
lien claimant." Either of these two action will release the property
from the federal lien.
The conditions under which a release of the federal lien on the
property will be given are:
1. The tax is paid or has become legally unenforceable.
2. A bond securing the payment of the tax is furnished.
3. The value of the property remaining subject to the lien after
a release of part of the property is twice the amount of the tax
debt plus any lien superior to the tax lien.
4. The government is paid an amount equal to the value of the
property for which a release is sought.
5. The tax lien has no value.
If the government refuses to grant a release of the property from its
junior lien it is then necessary for the mortgagee to join the federal
government as a defendant. Consent by the federal government to be
sued in federal or state courts by persons wishing to foreclose a lien
or mortgage or to quiet title to property in which the federal govern-
ment claims a lien is granted by statute. If the United States is sued
under the authority of this section it is necessary that the statute be
53 IxT. RE V. CODE of 1954 § 6323; Sherwood v. U.S., 5 F2d 991 (E.D. N.Y. 1925) ;
Oden v. U.S., 33 F.2d 553 (W.D. La. 1929); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. U.S., 107
F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1939); U.S. v. Cox, 119 F. Supp. 147 (N.D. Ga. 1953). But see
U.S. v. Rayan, 124 F. Supp. I (D.C. Minn. 1954); Trust Co. of Texas v. U.S. 3 F.
Supp. 683 (S.D. Tex. 1933). See 9 Mertens, The Law of Federal Taxation, § 54.42
(5th ed. 1955).
54 INT. REv. CODE of 1954 § 6325.
55 28 U.S.C.A. 2410.
58 See U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 301.6325-1 for the mechanics of obtaining a release.
57 28 U.S.C.A. 2410.
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strictly complied with, to insure that the action falls within the consent
given by the federal government.
It is suggested that the standard procedure to be followed in fore-
closing a mortgage include a search of the records immediately prior
to the commencement of the foreclosure action. If a lien is discovered
a release should be sought and if this fails the federal government
should be made a party defendant. If notice of a tax lien is not a
matter of record then normal foreclosure procedure is sufficient until
immediately prior to the sale date. Then another search should be
made to determine if a tax lien has been filed subsequent to the com-
mencement of the foreclosure action. This two-step search is necessary
because there are no authoritative cases which hold that a lis pendens
filed after the first search will preclude a federal lien fied subsequent
to the commencement of the action but prior to the sale date.58 If the
federal tax lien is not filed prior to the sale date, the purchaser takes
free from any secret federal lien or any liens which are subsequently
filed for record.8'
SUMMARY
In the main this has been nothing more than a "horseback appraisal"
of the federal tax lien. This lien is a potent weapon in the hands of
the tax collector, and the unwary have little chance of prevailing against
it. If this comment has done nothing more than impress this fact upon
the minds of the practitioner it has served its purpose.
In recapitulation the salient features of the federal tax lien are:
1. From the date of assessment and demand the federal government
has a lien on ali the property of the taxpayer.
2. A private lien which antedates the federal tax lien is not prior
in right unless it is specific and perfected.
3. An antedating federal tax lien which remains secret has priority
over all private liens except a specific and perfected mortgage,
pledge, purchase or judgment lien.
4. A mortgage, pledge, purchase or judgment lien which is specific
and perfected prior to the filing of a notice of the federal tax lien
is prior in right, though subsequent in time.
58 Sherwood v. U.S., 5 F2d 991 (E.D. N.Y. 1925) holds that a lis pendens is inop-
erative against a federal tax lien. There are numerous cases which hold that a tax lien
can be discharged only by the methods provided for in the federal statutes. See Oden
v. U.S., 33 F.2d 553 (W.D. La. 1929); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. U.S., 107 F.2d
311 (6th Cir. 1939) ; U.S. v. Cox, 119 F. Supp. 147 (N.D. Ga. 1953).
59 INT. REv. CODE of 1954 § 6323.
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